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Abstract: No viable account of the rise of the modern world in 19th century 
Europe can do without an account of the emergence of modern science in 17th 
century Europe. The indispensability of the latter event for the former has 
often been ignored, or denied, or maintained on needlessy shaky grounds. In 
this paper the author seeks to ground the historical conception of ‘no Indus-
trial Revolution without a preceding Scientific Revolution’ in rigorous argu-
ment. It takes its starting point in the engine that James Watt was in due time 
to transform into the steam engine, namely, Thomas Newcomen’s fire engine. 
The author demonstrates that at the very heart of his machine Newcomen 
employed, and could not but employ, revolutionary knowledge of the void 
and of air pressure. He also shows how sophisticated knowledge of this novel, 
modern scientific type stood squarely athwart such more commonsensical 
notions as used to mark rival efforts, be it earlier in Europe or in China or 
elsewhere, to come to grips with the phenomena of nature. The Newcomen 
engine further serves to show how the 18th century provided something like 
an ‘incubation period’, in course of which mostly British artisans of a wholly 
novel type learned by trial and error to bridge the vast gap between the theo-
retical solution to some practical problem and a truly viable, truly practicable 
solution.
Key Words: Scientific Revolution, Industrial Revolution, Economist Millen-
nium edition, fire engine, Needham problem
The lead-text for the paper that follows is a 3-page piece entitled The Road to Riches. 
It appeared at a prominent place in the special ‘Millennium’ issue of the Economist.1 
That special issue was built around a splendid idea. Take your vantage point at the 
previous millennium, in the year 1000 AD, and look a thousand years ahead – there 
is no possible way anybody in his right senses could have foreseen what our modern 
world of the year 2000 was going to look like. Even less could it have been predicted 
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at the time that Western Europe is where the big leap toward that modern world of 
ours was to occur. At the start of the first millennium there were several advanced 
civilizations, by and large on a par mutually, with Europe appearing as rather a 
late-comer among them. Certainly at first sight it is a profound enigma why, of all 
civilizations then around, it was this late-comer that, some nine centuries down 
the line, was the one to make the unexpected leap. In the three pages of The Road 
to Riches its (as always with the Economist) anonymous author faces the enigma 
squarely, and probes a number of possible solutions. He does not seek refuge in just 
one cause that allegedly explains it all. Nor do we encounter learned elaborations 
upon simple-minded one-liners about Westerners being more logical or having 
better genes or some other allegedly built-in, timeless superiority. Even better, his 
answers are also far removed from the other extreme of regarding the question 
of where the leap occurred as just a matter of chance not subject therefore to any 
deeper historical analysis.
In its first-rate journalism, then, this 3-page piece The road to riches provides 
a particularly good example of a sophisticated approach in which one cause, no 
cause, and cheap sloganizing are being shunned alike. Instead, we find some lucidly 
and succinctly rendered fruits of genuine, also wide-ranging, boldly comparative 
historical analysis. The piece opens with the observation that modern science and 
technology serve as powerful motor drives for present-day economic growth and 
social change. Therefore it seems an obvious move to seek what originally brought 
about the European leap likewise in science-based technology, with its meanwhile 
proven capacity for social change of the most drastic kind.
That answer sounds plausible – so the argument in The Economist goes on –, 
and it is unlikely to be entirely wrong. Still, it fails to satisfy, on at least three sig-
nificant counts:
(1) Up to Edison’s times around 1875, the huge majority of industry-promoting 
inventions, such as Hargreaves’ spinning-jenny at an early stage, owed virtually 
nothing to science.
(2) In the 17th century, pioneers like Galileo or Huygens or Hooke made rapid 
advances in science. They were keen to find applications for their finds and have 
them exploited in practice. But if these finds had indeed been so decisive, whence, 
then, the passage of at least a hundred years to come until industrialization even 
began to take off?
These two points lead to an interim conclusion, which reads: “The link between 
science and technology is subtler than you might think.” But a further objection to 
any straightforwardly causal connection between European science and European 
industrialization is raised in addition:
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(3) Other advanced civilizations, too, experienced periods of brilliantly flourish-
ing science and/or technology. This was true notably of China before, under the 
Qing, it lost its lead for good. At least in the Chinese case and possibly in others, 
too, these advanced civilizations came to the very brink of industrialization, yet 
they never managed to cross it.
The net conclusion drawn in the article at this point is that “science and technology, 
in short, can get far and then stop”. Consequently, the truly crucial question should 
run thus: “What happened in Western Europe in the 17th and early 18th centuries 
that failed to happen in the Western Europe of antiquity, or in China after 1400, or 
in the Islamic world after 1200?”
At this point of high suspense the article makes a turn that does not cease to 
amaze me. Without any breathing spell it goes on to tell us that “the question is 
ferociously debated by economic historians”. And once again without any pause or 
interruption, this leads on the final page to a once again quite knowledgeable dis-
cussion of the “three broad and overlapping things [that], between them, made the 
difference: values, politics and economic institutions.” Nowhere in this concluding 
section does either science or technology, let alone the “subtle link between them”, 
re-enter the scene. True, objection (3) implies that they cannot do so as indepen-
dent variables. But the coherence of the overall argument requires in no way their 
absence as dependent variables.
Nor is this the only ground for surprise at finding the role of science and tech-
nology in the making of the Industrial Revolution ignored from that point onward. 
For if we confront the conclusion thus drawn with the very consideration placed at 
the head of the piece, an odd paradox ensues. It now seems as if modern science & 
technology, which the author himself has just acknowledged to add very substan-
tially to all that at the present day drives our modern society forward, nonetheless, 
in being neither ‘values’ nor ‘politics’ nor ‘economic institutions’, had nothing at all 
to do with how modern society originally came into being. That is, ‘values’, ‘politics’, 
and ‘economic institutions’ jointly ushered in the modern world, subsequently to 
unfold under the steam of science-based technology. Not a very plausible course of 
events, to put it mildly. What, then, has been the point of calling attention in a seri-
ous work of history to a mere journalist’s sloppy reasoning?
One reason for spending time on the issue is that we had better not think of jour-
nalists in terms of ‘mere journalists’. Not only do the contents of The Economist reach 
a vastly larger, politically far more influential readership than any scholarly effort to 
set its conclusions right may even begin to hope for. But we should also realize that 
what we have here is really journalism at its very best, not only for the reasons I have 
just given in my second and third paragraphs, but also in that it reflects, and ably 
sums up, a good deal of current, scholarly thinking on the subject.
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Whose thinking? Well, chiefly economic historians’ thinking. The curious 
dichotomy between economic history and history of science & technology that the 
Economist piece displays is nothing but the reflection of a dichotomy that reigns in 
the world of scholarship. In The Scientific Revolution. A Historiographical Inquiry of 
1994 I have gone out of my way to deplore that professional historians of science have 
usually treated the emergence of modern science as “a secret treasure”.2 Decades ago, 
historians of science have illuminatingly conceptualized the emergence of modern 
science in 17th century Europe and elucidated what was so uniquely novel about the 
kind of science that did emerge. Yet with few exceptions they have failed to link this 
up other than in slogans with what the event has meant for the coming into being 
of our modern world. Indeed, the common run of historians of science has chosen 
to ignore that world-historical problem and to marginalize the few who have not. 
Consequently, a problem that really requires the expertise of just about all varieties 
of historians (political history and the history of religion definitely included), has 
become to a very large extent the domain of economic historians alone. I certainly 
do not want to begrudge them their concern. To the contrary, it is altogether a great 
boon that at least in one specialist discipline the problem has remained alive. The 
more so as this happens also to be the one where sophisticated, analytical-compara-
tive thinking has advanced to far greater heights than in any other branch of history. 
Further, an increasing number of chiefly economic historians has in past decades 
been crossing these borders – the names of Landes, O’Brien, Mokyr, Goldstone, 
whatever their mutual differences, come to mind at once. Still, look again at the 
three specific objections that in The Road to Riches led its author to exclude modern 
science & technology from the story of how the world got modern and rich. These 
objections are in truth far from sloppy. Even so, to find out what is tenable about 
them and what not requires a bit more familiarity with findings made by historians 
of science & technology than most economic historians possess as a rule.
My aim in the present paper, then, is to confront all three objections advanced 
in that Economist piece. I do so from the point of view of a historian of science con-
cerned to understand certain major issues concerning the rise of modern science in 
17th century Europe – its major components; how it could come about at all; how it 
is that it did so in Europe rather than elsewhere; what it meant for traditional crafts-
manship on the shorter and longer run, and what it has contributed to the coming 
into being of our modern world.3 In discussing the issues that are raised by the three 
Economist objections, I take the harnessing of steam power to be indispensable for 
arriving at a fair judgment of the piece as a whole. This is so because the story of 
steam helps us see
•	 why	objection	(1),	albeit	not	entirely	mistaken,	is	an	exaggeration	that	amounts	
to distortion;
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•	 how	to	rephrase,	and	 then	answer,	 the	very	good	question	posed	 in	objection	
(2);
•	 why	objection	(3)	is	untenable,	with	consequences.
In The Road to Riches the author has not, to be sure, quite ignored the pertinence 
of steam power for his argument. In regard of his objection (1), he does mention the 
steam-engine (albeit without any further explication or discussion of consequences 
for his own argument) as one exceptional piece of science-based technology prior 
to Edison’s times. In regard of his objection (3), he very strongly suggests (without 
quite committing himself) that in China even earlier than in Europe all the knowl-
edge about atmospheric pressure that one might need to build a steam-engine had 
already been discovered without that knowledge actually being tapped for going 
ahead and constructing such a machine. Only in regard of (2), on the application-
oriented science of Galileo and Huygens and Hooke and its failure for at least a 
century actually to be applied, does the author fail to mention steam power as an 
example, even though well he might have; as we shall see.
Where exactly, then, does the Economist piece go wrong in its effective down-
playing of what all that happened in science in 17th century Europe truly meant for 
the process of industrialization? To show you where, I take you inside Newcomen’s 
engine. Although in so doing I aim to make you consider it afresh, in my brief expla-
nation of how it works I claim no novelty whatsoever – it is all there in the literature 
on the history of steam technology,4 only the message of that literature does not 
seem always to get out to those whom it concerns.
Newcomen’s engine, from the outside in
To ease your entrance, I start 
from the outside (see Figure 1).5
Note that the caption does 
not speak of a steam-engine, 
but rather reads ‘The ENGINE 
for Raising Water (with a power 
made) by Fire’. Also note that, 
thus looked at from the outside, 
Figure 1: 
Newcomen Engine
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Figure 2: Su Sung’s Water Clock
there appears to be nothing in its construction that seems principally out of reach 
for any comparably daring inventor in any comparably advanced civilization of the 
pre-modern world.
Figure 2, for example, is a wood-block 
engraving of Su-Sung’s huge water-clock 
regulating the course of the planetarium-
like armillary sphere on top of it.6 This 
invention, by a high official of the North-
ern Sung dynasty, dates from the late 11th 
century CE. Looking at all this from the 
outside, no good reason presents itself for 
why a civilization capable of both invent-
ing and building so sophisticated a piece 
of machinery could not in time have pro-
duced a fire-engine like Newcomen’s or 
even the kind of steam-engine Watt later 
transformed it into.
We now move further inside. In Figure 
3,7 note first the big balance beam, with the 
mine pump rod hanging from a chain on 
the one side, and a piston on the other. The 
rod enables suspended buckets to pump 
water out of Britain’s coal mines, which is what the machine was made for. The pis-
ton fits closely into a cylinder which can be filled with steam from the boiler below, 
in a cycle regulated by the steam-valve in between. Also suspended from the balance 
beam is a small pump, allowing the cold mine-water it raises to be used for being 
sprayed into the cylinder. This likewise happens in a cycle, regulated in this case by 
the injection water cock in between. Finally, water leaves the cylinder through an 
eduction pipe and air leaves it through a ‘snifting valve’.
We must grasp next how this assembly causes the balance beam to make the 
mine pump rod go up and down and thus empty the mine of water. So we move far-
ther inside the engine, and seek to understand what the picture can no longer show. 
The effect of spraying cold water into a cylinder filled with steam is to condense the 
steam, thus leaving a vacuum inside. Consequently, the atmosphere presses down 
the piston, so that the mine pump rod is pulled upward. With the injection water 
cock shut off and the steam-valve opened, fresh steam enters the cylinder, the piston 
is pressed upward, and the process can repeat itself, up to some fifteen cycles per 
minute in practice for more than a century upon the engine’s invention around 
1710.
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The invention did have a prehistory. Slightly prior to Newcomen, Denis Papin 
(earlier Christiaan Huygens’ assistant in Paris) communicated a sketch to the Royal 
Society. This is significant in view of three distinct features of Newcomen’s inven-
tion. One is that Newcomen, not a scholar but a a skilled craftsman, is improving 
here upon a scholar’s proposal – a practice-oriented scholar to be sure, yet a scholar. 
Newcomen introduced a separate boiler rather than, as Papin had proposed, put-
ting a fire under the cylinder but the water in it. A second feature is Newcomen’s 
genius as an inventor, which stands expressed in the presence of the snifting valve 
and, above all, in the automated snap-action of the injection cock and the steam-
valve. It is these two features that turned the theoretical and, as such, unworkable 
solution to a practical problem that Papin had proposed into a truly practicable 
solution, into one that really could work, and did. Finally, the third feature concerns 
the unseen heart of the machine, the process of deliberately creating a void so as to 
enable atmospheric pressure, rather than horses or your fellow-man, to do work for 
you. What we have here is something transcending in a principal manner mere pre-
modern craft ingenuity however admirably ingenious at its best. I have just called 
Newcomen a genius. But both previously and later, both here and elsewhere the 
world has known technicians blessed with equal gifts. What, then, is so special about 
this fire-engine by Newcomen to make it the first product of technical ingenuity 
decisively different from, say, the medieval mechanical clock, from Su-Sung’s water 
clock, from Chang Hêng’s seismograph, or from al-Razi’s distillation vessels?
Revolutionary science in the engine
My answer to this question is fourfold. It is that at the heart of the machine we find 
the incarnation of a scientific idea – an idea made flesh; an idea explicitly formu-
lated and deliberately applied. It is, next, that that scientific idea, which is about the 
possibility of void space and of experimental proof for the effective voidness of cer-
tain spaces, was entirely unheard-of, without any precedent anywhere. It is, further, 
that that unprecedented scientific idea runs counter to any common-sense concep-
tion of nature. And it is, finally and most importantly, that that novel scientific idea 
is not just an isolated, bright idea such as may come up as a matter of course in 
some chain of ongoing, regular scientific advance, but is just one sample of some-
thing principally novel occurring at the time. This novel thing is that the body of 
ideas and practices out of which the recognition, creation, and effective proof of the 
void came forward alongside much, much else, comes down to a well-prepared and 
nonetheless quite radically novel mode of thought about nature as such.
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This mode of thought is that of modern science as it first came up in a – to us at pre-
sent – grosso modo recognizable way in 17th century Europe. This mode of thought 
about nature has in its broad outlines become quite routine to us nowadays; at the 
time, however, it looked extremely odd, menacing even, in that it went flat against 
a whole range of conceptions shared across cultures the entire pre-modern world 
over. For the first time, nature began in 17th century Europe to be addressed on a 
principally novel plane. That plane was neither a one-sided empiricism, with facts 
taken from everyday sense-perception and sheer common-sense and then arranged 
in orderly patterns on the same level of sense-perception and common-sense. Nor 
was it an even more one-sided intellectualism, with everyday observations of nature 
pressed into one or another set of all-encompassing, philosophical first-principles 
deduced a priori. Instead, a thoroughly counter-intuitive mode of nature-knowledge 
at a plane of understanding unprecedentedly intermediate between abstract phi-
losophy and plainly concrete common-sense observation came up in 17th century 
Europe. This mode of nature-knowledge was both immensely more reliable and, 
at least potentially, more useful than was true of any preceding mode of acquiring 
knowledge about nature.
Figure 3: Diagram of 
Newcomen Engine
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The vastly increased reliability of the mode of nature-knowledge that 17th century 
Europe began to pioneer, and the very principal reasons for it, are at the heart of what 
the Economist piece so tellingly overlooked.8 The vastly increased usefulness of the 
new science, as the Economist piece noted well, was apparent to many a pioneer right 
from the start. The trouble, as it also noted, was that useful application of a whole 
range of novel insights kept eluding them in almost every instance. This is true of 
nearly all those promising plans put forward over the entire period of the Scientific 
Revolution from Galileo up to Newton. Be it the harnessing of atmospheric pressure 
by making water boil on the bottom of a cylinder and then allowing it to condense 
by putting out the fire underneath (Papin, elaborating upon Huygens, von Guer-
icke, Pascal, Torricelli, and Galileo), or the attempted, scientific regulation of water 
streams (Castelli, elaborating upon Galileo), or efforts to make the deaf hear again 
(Hooke, elaborating upon Bacon), or even to produce artificial manure out of wood 
juice (Glauber, elaborating upon Paracelsus), it all came to naught.
Why did it all come to naught? Here again the Economist piece is quite right: the 
link between science and technology is subtler than we tend to think. More than 
that, prior to the 17th century Scientific Revolution there was scarcely any link at all. 
The kind of nature-knowledge that we can see by hindsight to have been applied in 
practical tools and machinery used to be intuited; as a rule, it was neither derived 
from, nor supported by, any available body of nature-knowledge. We can see for 
instance how the construction of certain stops in late medieval organs brilliantly 
exploited properties of the so-called overtones, or harmonics. Yet the very begin-
nings of acoustical knowledge of those harmonics, i.e., their one-by-one identifica-
tion as such, did not even begin to take place until more than a century later, in 
the ears and the quiet monastery of Father Marin Mersenne early in the Scientific 
Revolution.
To find out how the customary chasm between nature-knowledge and the crafts 
gave way to the kind of science-based technology that we tend to take for granted 
nowadays is among the most neglected empirical issues central to the Scientific 
Revolution. What hurdles were being encountered in practice, and what enabled 
scholars and craftsmen of later times to overcome them?9 I have made an all-across-
the-board survey, focused in particular on 17th century efforts to make mathematical 
science practicable.10 Here are some conclusions.
Between the Baconian dream and its realization
What is a machine? During the European Renaissance, prior to the birth of modern 
science, artisans out to improve the operation of, for example, saw-mills or water-
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wheels regarded these as composites of individual parts to which, so as to enhance 
their effect, one might add further parts at will. As one truly precocious excep-
tion, Leonardo da Vinci alone began to perceive, in the privacy of his handwritten 
notes, that machines are rather assemblies coherently made up of an identifiably 
circumscribed number of constructive elements. His desire to optimize the effect 
of machine tools was guided by an awareness that what one gains one way is neces-
sarily lost another. This led him toward no less exceptional ranges of experimental 
researches into possible chances for minimizing friction.11 About a century later, 
Galileo unwittingly took his departure in the very same fundamental insight into 
the nature of machine tools, so profoundly at variance with most craftsmen’s 
received wisdom on the subject. Instead of Leonardo’s early, fact-finding experi-
mentation, Galileo characteristically went on to pioneer the other, mathematical 
component of the beginnings of a theory of optimal engineering practice. He did so 
by arguing that all machines are jointly reducible in the end to the law of the lever. 
Here is how one rare historian of technology-and-science, the late Donald Cardwell, 
expressed the major practical change thus wrought in theory:
“How could one possibly compare a fulling stocks with a corn mill, a saw 
mill with a blast furnace, a mine pump with a pump for supplying a man-
sion with water? All of them did entirely different things and the only com-
mon question to ask was whether each machine served its purpose well. The 
answer […] could only be normative: it was a good machine or it was not. 
But according to Galileo’s arguments all machines, no matter what purposes 
they serve, have the common function of transmitting and applying ‘force’ or 
power as efficiently as possible and, moreover, the performance of machines 
can be quantified, for ideally the product of the driving ‘force’ and its velocity 
equals the product of the load multiplied by its velocity.”12
This was truly an insight with (on the longer term, to be sure) world-shaking sig-
nificance. Here we watch the domain of common-sense and rule-of-thumb driven 
craftsmanship being drawn into the counterintuitive, all-disturbances-removed, 
ideal-case domain of modern, mathematical science which Galileo pioneered. 
Single-handedly, Galileo showed that
“a machine croaking and groaning under its load is not, in spite of appear-
ances, necessarily doing the most work, [in that Galileo] saw that the inequal-
ity between the equilibrium force and the force required to set the machine 
in motion was not a principle of Nature; it is merely a consequence of the 
imperfection of all machines. A good machine will move at a uniform, 
unchanging velocity when the force and the load, including residual friction, 
are in equilibrium. A perfect machine, free from friction, distortion and other 
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defects, will accelerate (slowly if loaded) under an extremely small force until 
it reaches an infinite velocity.”13
Even so it was one thing to set common-sense convictions right in theory; still quite 
something else to draw practical benefits from these and related insights. To make 
craftsmanship enter the domain of mathematical science was hardly tantamount to 
turn it by the same token into science-based technology. Not Galileo or his disciples, 
but Edme Mariotte in the second half of the 17th century pioneered an effort, to be 
undertaken with increasing frequency over the 18th century, actually to calculate 
(however often outcomes proved mistaken at first) the work capacity of, notably, 
water-wheels and, later, engines using steam for their source of power.
This, then, is my theme here – the vast gap customarily obtaining between pre-
modern science and pre-modern craftsmanship; such chances for bridging that gap 
as were perceived right from the start in the early 17th century to be inherent in 
modern, Galilean, mathematical-experimental science; and, above all, the question 
of how realistic those expectations then proved to be on the shorter as well as on 
the longer term.
I shall now first pursue for a while this theme of mathematical science and the 
crafts. The mathematical handling of some scattered pieces of the natural world had 
flourished before in Hellenist civilization, which pioneered it, and in Islamic civili-
zation, which adopted and enriched the approach. As compared with these two civi-
lizations, Europe went much farther in exploring interfaces with the crafts. This was 
a highly unusual undertaking indeed. But for some legendary claims about Archi-
medes, and some actual applications of the law of the lever in pulleys and screws as 
described by Herôn, the highly intellectualist pursuit of knowledge of nature and 
the trial-and-error construction and improvement of such tools as eyeglasses or 
mechanical clocks went ahead in virtually watertight separation from one another. 
In this respect, the direct application of geometrical and/or arithmetical rules in 
linear perspective, in navigation and map-making, and in several military arts that 
took place in the European Renaissance was without world-historical precedent.
Even so we must consider that, by 1600, mathematicians had already come close 
to exhausting what they could usefully contribute to the creation of an illusion of 
painted space, to the outlay of fortresses, and to the determination of geographi-
cal latitude and the making of maps. So this might well have been the end of an 
interesting, relatively short-lived episode of collaboration between mathematicians 
and professional painters, soldiers, sailors, map-makers. But at this very point of 
imminent exhaustion a new vista arose from Galileo’s conviction that our empiri-
cal world is at bottom mathematical, joined to his actually demonstrating how 
empirical phenomena like free fall and projectile motion can indeed be handled 
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using mathematics. As he was well aware, a wholesale transformation of traditional 
craftsmanship had thus came within reach. How close was that reach? The promises 
that went with such expectations at the time were most often grandiose. Bracket-
ing the promises, I have surveyed what achievements were actually attained in the 
dozen or so areas of craft activity actually subjected to some degree of mathematical 
treatment in course of the 17th century. How did the newly realist bent of gaining 
knowledge of nature the mathematical way affect the ongoing pace of events in the 
realm of the crafts?
For an answer, I must first stress, as an utterly basic point, that we should not 
indulge our natural temptation to read the resounding successes of science-based 
technology that are so familiar to us back into those first probings undertaken in 
Europe prior to the advent of the very mode of science that was to make those suc-
cesses possible in the first place. Nor should we assume a priori that Galilean math-
ematical science, which indeed was to make so much of the difference on the longer 
term, necessarily began to make that difference all at once. In fact, my survey of 
literature in which a variety of crafts in 17th century Europe were examined, has led 
me to conclude that throughout the Scientific Revolution traditional craftsmanship 
proved impervious to any prescriptions reaching them from the side of pioneers of 
the new science. Craftsmanship operating by rule of thumb and, if aimed at inno-
vation, doing so through trial-and-error procedures kept prevailing for a variety 
of reasons. Mathematical precision was hardly or not at all attained, and if it was 
indeed this proved practically irrelevant for the time being. The crafts most decisive 
for everyday life (those responsible for food, clothing, shelter) remained in their tra-
ditional, trial-and-error state, whereas, without exception, often quite sophisticated 
mathematical thinking directed at the solution of more or less pressing practical 
issues proved as yet wholly impracticable. It does not matter whether we find our-
selves dealing with musical temperament, or with the mathematical improvement 
of windmills used for draining, or with the taming of water streams in the Po delta 
and the Venetian lagoon, or with efforts to enhance shooting range and improve 
shooting accuracy the mathematical way, or with estimating and comparing the 
strength of materials, or with the measurement of geographical longitude on board 
ship, or with the determination of machine efficacy with which I started my discus-
sion of these matters. For all the sophistication of the mathematical approaches 
advocated and most often tried out as well over the 17th century, in not one of the 
various crafts involved did practitioners feel by such efforts called upon to alter their 
customary ways of proceeding.
How could this be so? By century’s end the Scientific Revolution culminated in 
the universal laws of nature put down in Newton’s Principia and Opticks. How is it 
119ÖZG 20.2009.2
that by then the gap between mathematical science and the crafts yawned almost as 
widely as it had at the onset of the Revolution, about a century earlier?
One principal reason is that, from a contemporary point of view, there was 
scarcely ground for suspecting at the outset that the gap was so wide in the first 
place. A marvelous new tool of, in principle, great generality had now become 
available, the subjection of the empirical world to mathematical rule and order; 
why should the empirical world of craftsmanship fail smoothly to fall into line? At 
the time, the issue was not posed in anything like so clear-cut a manner as we can 
pose it in retrospect. Still, we may regard the Scientific Revolution as marked by a 
voyage of slowly yet surely advancing discovery that, and why, the gap could not be 
overcome by jumping over it in one big mathematical leap, but required a good deal 
of patient, laborious bridge-building.
What bridges, then, and who had to build them, craftsmen or mathematical 
scientists?
This differed considerably from case to case. Craftsmen’s virtually innate con-
servatism, their aptness to leave things that work intact and to seek solutions for 
upcoming practical problems in the general direction of what has already proved 
workable before, is sometimes quite functional, sometimes less so. It is very hard, 
often impossible, however, to decide in advance when we are dealing with expe-
rience-based, sound judgment, when with no less experience-based prejudice. 
Werckmeister, the church organist, can in retrospect be seen to have done well to 
ignore mathematical scientists and their tendency to prefer both mathematical and 
musical elegance over practicality. In contrast, Galileo’s analysis of machine efficacy, 
which likewise went against craftsmen’s intuition, and was likewise devoid as yet 
of possible practical consequences, was in due time to alter craft practice almost 
beyond recognition. It is hard for us not to sympathize with the predicament of 
those cardinals who, in the early 1690s in a committee on the river Reno in the 
Po delta, lacked any objective criteria to choose between the competing claims of 
Guglielmini, a mathematical scientist in Galileo’s wake, and of his Jesuit opponents 
and their down-to-earth experiential bent in the tradition of the great Renaissance 
artisans. We cannot but sympathize as well with Huygens’ complaint, in a report 
about the performance of his clocks on the route back from the Indies, how much 
their overseers had suffered “from the crew’s frequent scolding and mockery of this 
effort to measure longitude in a new way” which, as Huygens rightly foresaw, was in 
due time to save the lives of so many sailors.14
But the survey I have made also leads me to drawing some conclusions valid for 
all these varied cases.
First, the degree of urgency of the particular practical problem for which 
mathematics was adduced as a solution made no difference at all for the outcome. 
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Whether perceived at the time as pressing (notably, water management, and the 
determination of longitude on board ship) or not (in particular, the efficacy of 
machines and the strength of materials), none of these problems had even come 
close to resolution in practice by the century’s end.
Demand, then, did not sufficiently foster resolution; but neither did craftsmen’s 
conservative leanings necessarily stand athwart it. In many a case the very initiative 
came from craftsmen; even if not, when plausible modes of change in a new direc-
tion were put forward by mathematical scientists (in perspective, fortress building, 
navigation, map making), craftsmen ready to go along invariably came forward. 
From whatever, mostly status-related sources their inclination to stick to trusted 
procedures might spring in addition to the inherent one already adduced, the more 
open-minded among them could overcome it; what, then, did prevent such plau-
sible modes from presenting themselves in all other cases?
In retrospect, four impediments to practical success stood in the way of the big 
mathematical leap:
a. The weightiest impediment of all rested in a serious underestimation of the mess-
iness of the real world. For craft after craft it appeared in course of the Scientific 
Revolution that, beside determinants taken up indeed in the mathematical model, 
there were others of at least equal significance, and also many second-order effects, 
which somehow had to be brought under mathematical rule as well.
b. The mathematization of second-order effects, in particular, required an ability to 
handle non-uniformly varying magnitudes which the Euclidean doctrine of ratios 
was inherently incapable of satisfying but was to be yielded by the calculus.
c. Even if using Euclidean means only, craftsmen’s ability and/or readiness to grasp 
the apparently esoteric language of mathematics was very limited. Nor was there 
as yet sufficient incentive for the drastic educational reform required to make 
fruitful communication between craftsmen and mathematical scientists a matter 
of more than just rare good luck.
d. Such communication was further impeded by social distance. Many a mathe-
matical scientist stemmed from the lower or higher nobility or had to adopt its 
standards in any case, and thus tended to regard the equal footing really required 
for fruitful exchange as beneath his dignity.
Due to at least these four retrospectively distinguishable barriers, then, the crafts 
stood to gain very little from those numerous efforts undertaken with a view to their 
scientific improvement (I mention only in passing that, vice versa, mathematical sci-
ence did benefit greatly from the experiences thus undergone, which in most cases 
centered around the utterly novel practice of mathematical modeling).
To return to our gap, we do find in course of the century some budding recogni-
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tion of this state of affairs, as well as some early efforts to overcome it. Galileo and 
his Italian disciples provided the first recognizable cluster of crafts/mathematics 
interaction. These few men were greatly inclined to stick to one-sided, mathemati-
cal idealization in the sometimes more, sometimes less complacent expectation 
(fed by their still brand-new conception of the world as inherently mathematical) 
that experiment would confirm it or, if not, could conveniently be reasoned away. 
In the second half of the 17th century, in the Académie Royale des Sciences, Huygens 
and Mariotte, in particular, began, also mathematically but in a more open-minded 
experimental vein, to take the world’s messiness into account and to explore second-
order regularities. Finally, whereas contemporary concerns of the Royal Society with 
how to make the new science impinge on craftsmanship took a distinctly empiricist, 
hence, non-mathematical direction overall, in book II of Newton’s Principia we 
begin to discern a first glimpse of what the calculus, once applied to practical issues, 
might in due time be able to accomplish.
The removal of impediments (a) and (b), thus instructively explored by 
mathematical scientists in course of the 17th century, was to be pursued with ever 
increasing zest and refinement over the next, producing one mathematical model 
after another of sufficient sophistication to become of real practical value. In a few 
cases mathematical scientists turned themselves into something resembling crafts-
men. Most often, however, the emergence in course of the 18th century of craftsmen 
of a thus far wholly unknown type like Parent or Smeaton was to prove decisive in 
removing, or at least softening, impediments (c) and (d).
What, in terms of our Economist piece, do these conclusions mean? We conclude 
that its objection (2), about the great pioneers of 17th century science fostering prac-
tical application of their work in vain, is by and large sound. Not only does it cover 
the case of mathematical-experimental science well. But more empiricist, definitely 
non-mathematical yet otherwise similar efforts undertaken in Baconian circles to 
make their revolutionary, fact-finding experimentalism such as had equally arisen 
in revolutionary fashion in the 17th century serviceable in practice, display very 
much the same pattern. I already mentioned in passing Hooke’s vain hopes to make 
the deaf hear again, and Glauber’s schemes for turning wood juice into manure. It 
has further been shown how Hooke’s dynamical insights stood in the way of the 
successful resolution of certain other practical problems he had posed himself and 
believed he could solve with science (e.g., how to make a lamp burn steadily; or 
the optimal way to trim sails).15 And of course I have already broached the case of 
atmospheric pressure, which I shall now elaborate a little further since, early in the 
18th century, it was the very first to undergo a decisive twist.
The story of what eventually (unplanned and unforeseen) became the high 
pressure steam engine takes its departure in Galileo’s becoming aware of craft 
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experiences with the suction pump. 
The apparent impossibility to pump 
water to greater heights than c. 10 
meters led him to a radically novel, non-
philosophical, newly-scientific manner 
of thinking about the void. Philosophers 
had treated the void as an issue to be 
decided a priori from first-principles. 
Galileo rather felt that the matter had 
to be decided a posteriori, by means of 
mathematical theorizing plus experi-
mental testing. His disciples pursued the 
issue further using mercury (Fig. 4).
They quickly became persuaded 
that the space above the mercury in the 
vessel is void, and that you are dealing with a balance between the mercury column 
underneath the void space and the column of heavy air that presses upon the sur-
face. Pascal elaborated all this, and confirmed it the experimental way. Von Guericke 
sought to measure, exploit, and demonstrate in spectacular fashion the pressure 
exerted by the atmosphere (Fig. 5). Inspired by Guericke, Huygens sketched a design 
for an engine hopefully capable of the cyclical re-creation of a void space using gun 
Figure 4: Experiments with Mercury
Figure 5: Guericke’s Magdeburger Hemispheres
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powder at the bottom of a cylinder. His assistant Papin then replaced gun powder 
with boiling water and its cyclical condensation. So far events fit the pattern just 
sketched for both mathematical-experimental and Baconian-experimental science. 
With Papin’s device we have now in hands the theoretical solution to a practical 
problem, yet the practical solution remains out of sight, thus leaving current craft 
practice in the draining of mines unaffected. But then there is a decisive twist. The 
event of the Huguenot Papin crossing the Channel serves as a neat symbol – at that 
exact point Newcomen took over, turning Papin’s theoretical solution into a truly 
practicable one. It is on the European Continent mostly that ‘the theory of practice’ 
was elaborated. But the onset of its actual, practicable realization in course of the 
18th century proved, not only with Newcomen but with scores of others in his wake, 
to be a feat in large measure British. Why?
A British exception
To answer that question, we move a half-century ahead and consider two near-
simultaneous yet quite distinct efforts to improve the operation of Newcomen’s fire 
engine, meanwhile at work all over Britain’s coal mines for half a century. One effort 
at improvement was undertaken by James Watt, the other by John Smeaton.16 The 
latter was a highly gifted man capable of reaching the outer bounds of what a given 
line of attack still can yield. Watt was a genius endowed with two rare gifts: he could 
‘think laterally’; he could saturate himself with a problem largely of his own making, 
managing in the end to hit upon a solution that looks obvious only in retrospect. 
But their respective intellectual pre-histories also account for part of the differ-
ence. More so than Watt, Smeaton was drenched in the waters of the new science. 
When out to improve Newcomen’s engine, he applied to the job the very model 
of methodical experimentation. He successively altered one parameter at a time 
while keeping all others constant, with the result that at the end he had doubled the 
machine’s performance. From our present-day vantage point this is not much of a 
result – due to Smeaton’s efforts, in terms of energy efficacy the net yield increased 
from c. 0.5 to 1 %. But the proper criterion by which to measure the outcome is in 
contemporary terms – the net yield of the engine was no less than doubled. Even 
so this meant that a vast energy loss had marred its performance so far. The one to 
sense that this was so, was James Watt.
Watt’s original job was quite humble. He was asked to repair a 1:5 scale model of 
the engine, used in Glasgow University for demonstration purposes. In course of the 
job, which he originally approached “as a mere mechanic”, the machine induced in 
him a sense of wonder, at a far more fundamental level than any attained by Smea-
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ton. What actually happened to what he alone felt to be an outrageous amount of 
fuel burned away by the machine? Luck had its part, too, in that Watt was the local 
handyman at the very university where the onset of a science of heat was farthest 
advanced in the world. Still, what makes Watt unique as an inventor in that inter-
mediate class of what I call ‘engineers of a new kind’ is that, rather than using pieces 
of science already available, he single-handedly went ahead and discovered some 
more himself. But he also realized that, with that much accomplished, he still had 
to address the ensuing, tough problem of how to make those new scientific insights 
in ‘theoretical practice’ serviceable for ‘practicable practice’ in its turn. This was the 
harder to do as his own arguments and calculations ended in a paradox – the engine 
had to be cooled down and kept hot at one and the same time. Here is where Watt’s 
genius revealed itself. He managed to bypass the paradox, and invented the separate 
condenser. Now the pathway was opened toward ever increasing savings in energy 
and costs, and also toward turning the engine to uses far beyond emptying mines 
of water.
At this point, recall two key elements in my preceding analysis of the 17th century 
gap between mathematical science and the crafts, to wit, the mathematical overshoot-
ing of the mark, and the underestimation of the world’s messiness. Under the aegis of 
Francis Bacon, whose message few on the Continent were prepared to take at all seri-
ously, British scholars had turned themselves into masters of the messy, while leaving 
sophisticated mathematics rather to the Continent. From c. 1700 onward, culturally 
dominant France served as the locus for expertise in advanced mathematical science. 
By that time, Britain in its turn had a century of rather haphazard, Baconian experi-
mentation behind it. And this is how Britain could become the expert in precisely 
the sort of relatively low-level finding and then binding together of scientific facts 
where the messy problems one encounters when turning ‘theoretical practice’ into 
‘practicable practice’ were most often situated. This is a crucial point indeed. Jona-
than Swift in Gulliver’s Travels mercilessly satirized the haphazard experimentation 
that flourished in the Royal Society, in apparently pointless projects like (in Swift’s 
unforgettable example) ‘the extraction of sunbeams out of cucumbers’. Less than 
half a century later it turned out that the tentative, certainly theory-imbued yet 
comparatively low-level empiricism which Swift had helped make look so ridiculous 
proved to be the very approach most proper for effectively bridging the gap. For all 
kinds of reasons Britain also acquired an edge in overcoming impediments (c) and 
(d), craftsmen education and decreasing social distance. For instance, associations 
like the Birmingham Lunar Society emerged where entrepreneurs, scientists, and 
engineers of the new type met regularly and exchanged novelties.
To sum up the present point. We are dealing here, not with British exception-
alism as a broad outlook on history, but rather with a quite specific, truly British 
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exception. Between Newton’s death in 1727 and Maxwell’s early probings in the 
1860s mathematical science was hardly Britain’s strong point. In the 18th century 
it is rather on the Continent that we find men like Parent or Bélidor concerned 
with the application of mathematical science to practical practice, in direct con-
tinuation of work by Huygens and Mariotte. But insofar as the less mathematical 
sciences are concerned, Britain is where the significant inventions were made. With 
men like Harrison, Newcomen, Smeaton, Watt, we watch the rise of engineers of 
a wholly new kind – men to pick up such components of modern science as had 
come up in ‘theoretical practice’, and then fruitfully to join these to the greatest gifts 
of truly inventive craftsmen of the past. That is how Harrison mastered sufficient 
scientific theory in the domain of metal expansion, and joined it to the kind of 
single-minded, manual dexterity and inventive genius not even the most practice-
minded scientist possessed, so as to find the practicable solution to the problem of 
longitude solved long before in ‘theoretical practice’. That, too, is how Newcomen 
did what Papin had not done. Papin had proposed to turn the condensation of 
boiling water in a cylinder and the usage of the consequent rise of the piston for the 
working stroke – Newcomen turned the idea into a practicable engine. Not count-
ing some success stories of craft/science interaction in a few 17th century scientific 
instruments, which really are a case apart, Newcomen’s 1712 engine was the first 
large-scale specimen of that world-historically unprecedented phenomenon, the 
onset of science-based technology.
Back now to our Economist piece, and its objection (2) in particular. We may 
wholeheartedly agree with its author that Galileo’s or Huygens’ or Hooke’s science 
was not as yet up for practical application. But we must also emphasize against him 
that the first significant stirrings of a science-based technology are to be dated, not 
to Edison’s times but 150 years earlier, to the early 18th century. What happened in 
the 17th century was in effect a learning process, which began to pay off in the 18th, 
when a new type of engineer learned to combine craft practice of the customary, 
trial-and-error and rules-of-thumb kind with advanced scientific insights, be these 
picked up orally or in writing. Of that new type, Thomas Newcomen stands out 
as a very early, possibly the earliest representative, with men like John Harrison of 
chronometer fame or John Smeaton, who doubled the fire-engine’s effective power, 
following in his footsteps. The mechanician James Watt then came up with basic 
scientific insights about heat and steam of his own finding, which led to so drastic 
a transformation of the fire-engine that henceforth it could serve to power, not just 
the pumping of mines which under other market conditions might also have been 
performed by horse- or man-power, but entire production processes. As noted, 
Watt in so doing brought our new type of engineer to a, once again, novel plane of 
achievement.
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To round off this particular issue in terms of our Economist piece, we can now 
see that its objections (1) and (2) combined, i.e., the objection arising from the gap 
between the Scientific Revolution and the onset of industrialization, is not really 
an objection to positing a close causal connection between the two events at all. 
Rather, it may serve as a stimulus toward a better understanding of how exactly the 
connection is to be drawn.
A Chinese steam engine?
One gap in the argument remains to be filled. The Economist piece strongly implies 
(and some economic historians affirm without much ado) that at least the basics of 
what, in the 1760s through 1790s, James Watt wrought out of Thomas Newcomen’s 
first piece of science-based technology might just as well have been pulled off in 
China. But is this a plausible story line? Even if it were true that knowledge about 
atmospheric pressure was available in China, we would at best have a necessary, 
yet certainly not a sufficient condition for a Chinese steam-engine or even a fire-
engine. I keep in high regard the heuristic fertility of imagined, alternative pathways 
taken by humankind beyond the ones actually in past or present. As we do in our 
everyday lives, so in history too we ought to distinguish at all times between three 
kinds of events: those that happened, those that failed to happen because they could 
not possibly have happened, and those that failed to happen even though realisti-
cally speaking they might well have happened. For instance, numerous reasons 
have led me to think that some Galileo-like achievement by the end of the Golden 
Age of Islamic science is among the alternative pathways that might in principle 
have been taken. But the case of China is different. A native-Chinese steam-engine 
belongs rather to my second category of historical events – the (given the state 
of affairs at that particular time and place) inherently impossible ones. Given the 
overall tenor of nature-knowledge in China, I cannot possibly imagine what such 
an alternative pathway might have looked like. In particular, I fail to see how such 
a piece of machinery might ever have been constructed in the absence of the kind 
of counter-intuitive knowledge of the void which only incipient modern science in 
Europe began to provide. What is so special about the fire-engine and, a fortiori, 
the steam-engine is not that in how it works usage is being made of the action of 
certain scientific principles. So do a celt or a bellows. The discriminating question 
is whether the usage was conscious and, if so, whether that consciousness was necessar-
ily required. Take the case of the mixture stops in late medieval organs that I have 
mentioned before. Here it was quite possible to put to marvelously productive usage 
scientific principles unknown as such. The effect was attained rather by arranging 
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and subtly cutting up certain kinds of organ pipes in a purely empirical, trial-and-
error manner. So, the true question to ask about a possible, alternative pathway for 
the steam-engine is whether it might have been pulled off with condensation of 
steam in a vessel and atmospheric pressure being exerted upon the void thus cre-
ated, without knowing about it. Might have happened with the fire-engine what 
happened with those mixture stops, i.e., craft construction upon an unknown scien-
tific foundation? My mind boggles at the notion that it might ever have occurred to 
anyone anywhere to put together, just gropingly, a boiler, a cylinder, a piston, and an 
assembly fit to ensure regular condensation-cycles in a space regularly drawn void. 
Maybe it is just my mind that boggles, but at the very least the burden of proof rests 
upon those who fancy that there is no problem here at all, and that the West owes 
the prime power mover behind significant stages of its industrialization process 
to sheer chance. None other than Joseph Needham, in the ‘Newcomen Centenary 
Lecture’ he delivered in 1963 for the Newcomen Society under the title ‘The Pre-
Natal History of the Steam-Engine’, took the inconceivability of such a hypothetical 
occurrence wholly for granted. This is the more significant as Needham rarely if 
ever forwent a chance to raise a claim for Chinese priority and general excellence 
in science and technology. In this particular paper he argued no more than that 
James Watt, both for making his steam-engine double-acting and for converting 
its to-and-fro motion into rotary motion, may well have made unconscious usage 
of certain techniques devised first in pre-modern China and then transmitted to 
Europe along a hypothetical yet (in Needham’s reconstruction) plausible route. So 
that, in his peroration, Needham concluded that
“no single man was ‘the father of the steam-engine’; no single civilisation 
either […] Yet no one comes nearer to deserving the title than Thomas New-
comen. In the light of the foregoing analysis he stands out as a typical figure 
of that modern science and technology which grew up in Europe only, while 
his successors, great as they were, drew upon older Asian inventions more 
than has hitherto been recognised.”17
Modern science and the Western origins of the modern world
We survey now one final time the three objections raised in the Economist piece 
against the idea (which it grants at the outset to be so plausible at first sight) that 
modern science & technology were highly instrumental in bringing forth our mod-
ern world. We conclude that that idea, for all those well-chosen objections against 
it, keeps expressing a profound historical truth. Yes, science & technology and the 
relation between them are subtler than is often being thought. Yes, the pioneering 
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period of our modern science is not when our modern, science-based technology 
came into being. But no, the advent of that modern, science-based technology did 
not have to await Edison. Yes, there are craft elements in the Industrial Revolution 
that could do well without modern science or any science at all (notably the first 
machines for mass spinning and weaving), even though even there modern science 
quickly became instrumental, too (e.g., in providing the chemicals indispensable for 
mass bleaching and dyeing). But no, the Industrial Revolution as the event par excel-
lence to usher in our modern world cannot even be thought of if a science-based 
technology, and, hence, the kind of science on which to base such a technology in 
the first place, had not come into being before. And no, there is no possible way 
for products of science-based technology to have come into being along any other 
route than that of modern science as a necessary (though not, indeed, as a by itself 
sufficient) condition.
These conclusions in their turn raise two further questions of major propor-
tions. Here is not the place to seek to resolve them, but at least they ought to be 
broached.
The first major question is, simply, What about China? Even if it be granted that 
the steam engine requires modern science as an indispensable precondition, a good 
part of my argument were to fall flat after all if it could successfully be argued that 
our modern science might just as well have emerged in China or in any of the other 
great pre-modern civilizations, with its actual emergence in 17th century Europe 
being just a chance event as some economic historians maintain or at least take for 
granted. It would go far beyond the limits of the present paper to place before the 
reader my own effort at resolving the compound of questions here involved. Joseph 
Needham was the first to raise it on the grand scale and to seek a variety of answers 
to it.18 The question has subsequently given rise to much debate of a (most often) 
rather ill-informed kind. Here is a point-by-point précis of how I have come to 
conceive of the issues principally involved.19
In the first place, for the only two pre-modern civilizations which experienced 
sustained bouts of advanced research into the true nature of natural phenomena, 
the Chinese and the Islamic, things stand mutually quite differently. Nature-
knowledge in the Islamic world was like its mostly later, medieval and Renaissance 
European counterpart insofar as both took their origin in the Greek corpus of 
nature-knowledge. The question of why modern science eventually arose in the 
latter, not the former, reduces in my view to the question of how it is that, of two 
overall rather similar episodes, the Golden Age of Islamic nature-knowledge in 
the 9th to 11th centuries and the Golden Age of Renaissance nature-knowledge in 
the late 15th and 16th centuries, the latter was followed by a range of revolution-
ary transformations whereas the other was not. Modern science rested as an as yet 
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unrecognized, developmental possibility in the Greek corpus of mathematical and 
natural-philosophical researches. The question is whether that potential was ever 
to be realized. For that, a ‘cultural transplantation’, or wholesale migration of the 
Greek legacy to another environment than the one in which it emerged originally, 
was indispensable. In particular for mathematical science in the Alexandrian tradi-
tion of Euclid and Archimedes and Ptolemy, a Galileo-like development was not 
ruled out beforehand on grounds of its content alone. Why that development did 
take place in Europe, not in the Islamic world, has less to do with some purportedly 
essential character of either of these civilizations or with any given characteristic of 
the monotheistic faith reigning in either than with the historical incident of vast 
waves of military invasion. Around 1050, near-coincident with the very Golden Age 
of Islamic science, one nomadic horde after another began to trample underfoot the 
fine ramifications of the civilization in which that science was fostered, in contrast 
with Europe, which then and later was spared such wanton destruction.
With China not the developmental possibilities of the Greek way of dealing with 
natural phenomena form the crucial point, but rather the developmental potential 
of an indigenous approach to nature profoundly different from the Greek. In the 
Chinese conception, which likewise began to be developed in the 6th/5th centuries 
BC, what coherence was supposed to underlie the endless variety of phenomena 
resided in their mutual dependence.
“The regularity of natural processes is conceived of, not as a government of 
law, but of mutual adaptations to community life […] [The way of the Chi-
nese was] to systematize the universe of things and events into a structural 
pattern which conditioned all the mutual influences of its different parts […]
For the ancient Chinese, things were connected rather than caused […] The 
universe is a vast organism, with now one component, now another, taking 
the lead at any one time, with all the parts co-operating in a mutual service 
which is perfect freedom.
In such a system as this, causality is not like a chain of events […] The con-
cept of causality where the idea of succession was subordinated to that of 
interdependence dominated Chinese thinking.”20
The world, in this conception, is an infinitely subtle fabric. Each thread, however tiny, 
is interwoven with every other. The nature of the fabric can be grasped by means 
of correlations, so as to get at the various ways in which the mutual coherence of 
all things makes itself felt in some given phenomenon. Concepts to exemplify and 
express this correlative way of thinking are tao (the Way), ch’i (matter/energy), wu-
hsing (the five phases), and yin-yang. Together, they form the core of what would 
eventually be turned into the Chinese view of the world.
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It shall forever remain a moot question whether the corpus of nature-know-
ledge to be constructed out of this correlative conception of things might in due 
time have given rise to the core of modern science, the way modern science was 
in the end to be grafted upon the Greek corpus. On the one hand, the Chinese 
approach was marked by an intuitive plausibility and an observational streak far 
removed from core features of modern science – those counterintuitive mathemati-
cal features insisted upon in the above. On the other hand, the link with practice 
in general and with advanced craftsmanship in particular was far closer in China 
than in pre-modern Europe, as for instance with Shen Kua’s 11th century theorizing 
about magnetism and his invention of something like the compass. In my view the 
decisive reason for why no revolutionary transformation in the general direction 
of modern science ever took place in Chinese civilization rests in the circumstance 
that, unlike with Graeco-Roman civilization, its Chinese counterpart managed over 
the centuries to survive fundamentally unscathed every single effort to subdue, let 
alone destroy it. Even in the two cases of outside conquest (Mongol and Manchu) 
rapid sinification left the fundamental integrity of Chinese civilization intact. As 
a consequence, such chances for refreshment of a more or less radical kind as the 
Greek corpus repeatedly received (once in the Islamic world, twice in Europe) did 
not come up for the Chinese view of the world such as it had taken shape under the 
Han. Once established, it kept being expanded and made ever more intricate to be 
sure, yet without an occasion ever arising for the correlative conception of things 
to be subjected to scrutiny of a fundamental kind and for the outer bounds of that 
conception to be explored or perhaps even trespassed. In short, if something like the 
Scientific Revolution were to happen at all, it was to be as a consequence of cultural 
transplantation of the Greek corpus, not of any other kind of event.
There is, finally, another, quite major question that in the present paper can 
only be outlined, not answered. What is it that turned Watt’s steam engine from a 
small-scale invention into a real-life machine and, from there, into an immensely 
productive one? I have argued that by mid-18th century Europe had arrived at the 
brink of a viable technology erected on occasion upon a previously unheard-of, 
scientific basis. For all this to usher in the onset of industrialization, however, 
something more was of course indispensably required – the economic opportunity 
that actually presented itself in late 18th century Britain in the guise of a readiness to 
invest in such technological novelties as presented themselves. An in many respects 
independent chain of argument serves to explain the emergence of that economic 
opportunity leading to those investments and the productive success thereof. The 
historical question that continues to baffle me more than any other, then, is this: 
How, in its turn, to explain this confluence of two not fully yet by and large indepen-
dent streams of historical events? Why should the retrospectively required mode of 
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science and the retrospectively required need-cum-readiness for large-scale invest-
ment be there at just the same place at just the same time? There are answers to that 
question of questions, too,21 but not ones that still fit in the frame of the issue here 
addressed of the onset of a science-based technology neither with Edison nor in 
China or elsewhere, but in 18th century Britain as the outcome of a major learning 
process instigated by the Europe-wide Scientific Revolution of the 17th century.
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